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Let G be a group of prime order q with generator g. We study hardcore subsets H ⊂ G of the discrete logarithm (DL) log g in the model of generic algorithms. In this model we count group operations such as multiplication, division while computations with non-group data are for free. It is known from Nechaev (1994) and Shoup (1997) 
i.e., about 1 2 √ q times the generic DL-complexity √ 2q for the entire group G. Interestingly, our generic lower bounds hold for arbitrary multivariate exponentiations and not just for multiplications/division. Short secret keys. Our main result justifies to generate secret keys of DL-cryptosystems from random seeds with 1 2 log 2 q bits. For this expand a random integer x ∈ R [0,
√ q] of 1 2 log 2 q bits using a strong hash function SH into a pseudo-random integer SH(x ) ∈ P R [0, q[. The corresponding pair x , g SH(x ) is a DL-key pair that is -for generic attacks -nearly as strong as pairs x, g x for truly random x ∈ R [0, q[. This is because the generic DL-complexity is for almost all subsets H ⊂ G of size √ q about 1 2 √ q times the generic DL-complexity for G. Clearly, a strong hash function SH yields a set of pseudo-random public keys SH[0,
√ q] ⊂ [0, q[ of size Ω( √ q) since otherwise collisions SH(x ) = SH(x ) can be constructed using less than Ω( √ q) function evaluations [0, √ q] x → SH(x). Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the set SH[0, √ q] does not fall into the exceptional class of subsets H ⊂ G where log g is easy in the generic model. Generating secret keys from short random seeds can be practical if a strong hash function SH is at hand anyway. Now, there is a theoretical justification that seeds of length 1 2 log 2 q are nearly of the highest security level while shorter seeds are less secure. Moreover, as the generic DL-complexity is m 2 +o(m) for almost all subsets H ⊂ G of size m, it is sufficient to generate secret DL-keys from seeds x ranging over a set of size m that is so large that m 2 generic steps are infeasible -at present m ≥ 2 80 is sufficient.
Fast pseudo-random exponentiation. An intriguing challenge along this line is to replace SH in the short secret key representation by a pseudorandom function F that speeds up the exponentiation x → g F (x ) . We will study this problem in another submission.
